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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates a population-based training regime based on game-theoretic
principles called Policy-Spaced Response Oracles (PSRO). PSRO is general in the
sense that it (1) encompasses well-known algorithms such as fictitious play and
double oracle as special cases, and (2) in principle applies to general-sum, many-
player games. Despite this, prior studies of PSRO have been focused on two-player
zero-sum games, a regime wherein Nash equilibria are tractably computable. In
moving from two-player zero-sum games to more general settings, computation of
Nash equilibria quickly becomes infeasible. Here, we extend the theoretical under-
pinnings of PSRO by considering an alternative solution concept, α-Rank, which
is unique (thus faces no equilibrium selection issues, unlike Nash) and tractable
to compute in general-sum, many-player settings. We establish convergence guar-
antees in several games classes, and identify links between Nash equilibria and
α-Rank. We demonstrate the competitive performance of α-Rank-based PSRO
against an exact Nash solver-based PSRO in 2-player Kuhn and Leduc Poker. We
then go beyond the reach of prior PSRO applications by considering 3- to 5-player
poker games, yielding instances where α-Rank achieves faster convergence than
approximate Nash solvers, thus establishing it as a favorable general games solver.
We also carry out an initial empirical validation in MuJoCo soccer, illustrating the
feasibility of the proposed approach in another complex domain.
1 INTRODUCTION
Creating agents that learn to interact in large-scale systems is a key challenge in artificial intelligence.
Impressive results have been recently achieved in restricted settings (e.g., zero-sum, two-player
games) using game-theoretic principles such as iterative best response computation (Lanctot et al.,
2017), self-play (Silver et al., 2018), and evolution-based training (Jaderberg et al., 2019; Liu et al.,
2019). A key principle underlying these approaches is to iteratively train a growing population of
player policies, with population evolution informed by heuristic skill ratings (e.g., Elo (Elo, 1978))
or game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibria. A general application of this principle
is embodied by the Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) algorithm and its related extensions
(Lanctot et al., 2017; Balduzzi et al., 2019). Given a game (e.g., poker), PSRO constructs a higher-
level meta-game by simulating outcomes for all match-ups of a population of players’ policies. It then
trains new policies for each player (via an oracle) against a distribution over the existing meta-game
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
12
82
3v
1 
 [c
s.M
A]
  2
7 S
ep
 20
19
Preprint.
policies (typically an approximate Nash equilibrium, obtained via a meta-solver1), appends these
new policies to the meta-game population, and iterates. In two-player zero sum games, fictitious play
(Brown, 1951), double oracle (McMahan et al., 2003), and independent reinforcement learning can
all be considered instances of PSRO, demonstrating its representative power (Lanctot et al., 2017).
Prior applications of PSRO have used Nash equilibria as the policy-selection distribution (Lanctot
et al., 2017; Balduzzi et al., 2019), which limits the scalability of PSRO to general games: Nash
equilibria are intractable to compute in general (Daskalakis et al., 2009); computing approximate
Nash equilibria is also intractable, even for some classes of two-player games (Daskalakis, 2013);
finally, when they can be computed, Nash equilibria suffer from a selection problem (Harsanyi et al.,
1988; Goldberg et al., 2013). It is, thus, evident that the reliance of PSRO on the Nash equilibrium
as the driver of population growth is a key limitation, preventing its application to general games.
Recent work has proposed a scalable alternative to the Nash equilibrium, called α-Rank, which
is tractable even in general games (Omidshafiei et al., 2019), making it a promising candidate for
population-based training. Given that the formal study of PSRO has only been conducted under the
restricted settings determined by the limitations of Nash equilibria, establishing its theoretical and
empirical behaviors under tractable meta-solvers remains an important and open research problem.
We study several PSRO variants in the context of general-sum, many-player games, providing
convergence guarantees in several classes of such games for PSRO instances that use α-Rank as
a meta-solver. We also establish connections between Nash and α-Rank in specific classes of
games, and identify links between α-Rank and the Projected Replicator Dynamics employed in prior
PSRO instances (Lanctot et al., 2017). We develop a new notion of best response that guarantees
convergence to the α-Rank distribution in several classes of games, verifying this empirically in
randomly-generated general-sum games. We conduct empirical evaluations in Kuhn and Leduc Poker,
first establishing our approach as a competitive alternative to Nash-based PSRO by focusing on
two-player variants of these games that have been investigated in these prior works. We subsequently
demonstrate empirical results extending beyond the reach of PSRO with Nash as a meta-solver by
evaluating training in 3- to 5-player games. Finally, we conduct preliminary evaluations in MuJoCo
soccer (Liu et al., 2019), another complex domain wherein we use reinforcement learning agents as
oracles in our proposed PSRO variants, illustrating the feasibility of the approach.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Games We consider K-player games, where each player k ∈ [K] has a finite set of pure strategies
Sk. Let S =
∏
k S
k denote the space of pure strategy profiles. Denote by S−k =
∏
l 6=k S
l the set
of pure strategy profiles excluding those of player k. Let M(s) = (M1(s), . . . ,MK(s)) ∈ RK
denote the vector of expected player payoffs for each s ∈ S. A game is said to be zero-sum if∑
kM
k(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. A game is said to be symmetric if all players have identical strategy
sets Sk, and for any permutation ρ, strategy profile (s1, . . . , sK) ∈ S, and index k ∈ [K], one has
Mk(s1, . . . , sK) = Mρ(k)(sρ(1), . . . , sρ(K)). A mixed strategy profile is defined as pi ∈ ∆S , a
tuple representing the probability distribution over pure strategy profiles s ∈ S. The expected payoff
to player k under a mixed strategy profile pi is given byMk(pi) =
∑
s∈S pi(s)M
k(s).
Nash Equilibrium (NE) Given a mixed profile pi, the best response for a player k is de-
fined BRk(pi) = arg maxν∈∆
Sk
[Mk(ν,pi−k)]. A factorized mixed profile pi(s) =
∏
k pi
k(sk)
is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if pik ∈ BRk(pi) for all k ∈ [K]. Define NASHCONV(pi) =∑
kM
k(BRk(pi),pi−k)−Mk(pi); roughly speaking, this measures “distance” from an NE (Lanctot
et al., 2017). In prior PSRO instances (Lanctot et al., 2017), a variant of the replicator dynamics
(Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), called the Projected Replicator Dynamics
(PRD), has been used as an approximate Nash meta-solver (see Appendix F for details on PRD).
α-Rank While NE exist in all finite games (Nash, 1950), their computation is intractable in general
games, and their non-uniqueness leads to an equilibrium-selection problem (Harsanyi et al., 1988;
Goldberg et al., 2013). This limits their applicability as the underlying driver of training beyond the
two-player, zero-sum regime. Recently, an alternate solution concept called α-Rank was proposed by
1A meta-solver is a method that computes, or approximates, the solution concept that is being deployed.
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Player 1’s 
policy set
......
Player k’s 
policy set
Player K’s 
policy set
Profile distribution
Meta-solver Oracle
......
Profile distribution
Randomly initialize player policy sets
... ...
Game simulations
(a) Complete: compute missing
payoff tensorM entries via game
simulations.
(b) Solve: given the updated pay-
off tensor M , calculate meta-
strategy pi via meta-solver M.
(c) Expand: append a new policy
to each player’s policy space us-
ing the oracle O.
Figure 1: Overview of PSRO(M, O) algorithm phases.
Omidshafiei et al. (2019), the key associated benefits being its uniqueness and tractable computation in
many-player and general-sum games, making it a promising means for directing multiagent training.
The α-Rank distribution is computed by constructing the response graph of the game: each strategy
profile s ∈ S of the game is a node of this graph; a directed edge points from any profile s ∈ S to
σ ∈ S in the graph if (1) s and σ differ in only a single player k’s strategy and (2)Mk(σ) >Mk(s).
α-Rank constructs a random walk along this directed graph, perturbing the process by injecting a
small probability of backwards-transitions from σ to s (dependent on a parameter, α, whose value
is prescribed by the algorithm); this ensures irreducibility of the resulting Markov chain and the
existence of a unique stationary distribution, pi ∈ ∆S , called the α-Rank distribution. The masses
of pi are supported by the sink strongly-connected components (SSCCs) of the response graph
(Omidshafiei et al., 2019). For more details on α-Rank, see Appendix E and Rowland et al. (2019).
Oracles We define an oracle O as an abstract computational entity that, given a game, computes
policies with precise associated properties. For instance, a best-response oracle Ok(pi) = BRk(pi)
computes the best-response policy for any player k, given a profile pi. One may also consider
approximate-best-response oracles that, e.g., use reinforcement learning to train a player k’s policy
against a fixed distribution over the other players’ policies, pi−k. Oracles play a key role in population-
based training, as they compute the policies that are incrementally added to players’ growing policy
populations (McMahan et al., 2003; Lanctot et al., 2017; Balduzzi et al., 2019). The choice of oracle
O also affects the training convergence rate and final equilibrium reached (e.g., Nash or α-Rank).
Empirical Game-theoretic Analysis PSRO relies on principles from empirical game-theoretic
analysis (EGTA) (Walsh et al., 2002; Phelps et al., 2004; Wellman, 2006). Given a game (e.g., poker),
EGTA operates via construction of a higher-level ‘meta-game’, where strategies s correspond to
policies (e.g., ‘play defensively’ in poker) rather than atomic actions (e.g., ‘fold’). A meta-payoff
table M is then constructed by simulating games for all joint policy combinations, with entries
corresponding to the players’ expected utilities under these policies. Game-theoretic analysis can
then be conducted on the meta-game in a manner analogous to the lower-level game, albeit in a much
more scalable manner. As the theoretical discussion hereafter pertains to the meta-game, we use s,
M , and pi to respectively refer to policies, payoffs, and distributions at the meta-level, rather than the
underlying low-level game. In our analysis, it will be important to distinguish between SSCCs of the
underlying game, and of the meta-game constructed by PSRO; we refer to the latter as meta-SSCCs.
3 POLICY-SPACE RESPONSE ORACLES: NASH AND BEYOND
We first overview Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) prior to presenting our findings. Given an
underlying game (e.g., Poker), PSRO first initializes the policy space S using randomly-generated
policies, then expands the players’ policy populations in three iterated phases: complete, solve, and
3
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Algorithm 1 PSRO(M, O)
1: Initialize the players’ policy set S =
∏
k S
k via random policies
2: for iteration ∈ {1, 2, · · · } do
3: Update payoff tensorM for new policy profiles in S via game simulations . (Fig. 1a)
4: Compute the meta-strategy pi using meta-solverM(M) . (Fig. 1b)
5: Expand the policy space for each player k ∈ [K] via Sk ← Sk ∪ Ok(pi) . (Fig. 1c)
Game type M O Converges to α-Rank?
SP α-Rank BR 7 (Example 1)
SP α-Rank PBR 3 (Sub-SSCC,† Proposition 3)
MP α-Rank BR 7 (Example 2)
MP α-Rank PBR 3 (With novelty-bound oracle,† Proposition 1)
SP / MP Uniform or Nash BR 7 (Examples 4 and 5, Appendix B.2)
Table 1: Theory overview. SP and MP, resp., denote single and multi-population games. BR and PBR,
resp., denote best response and preference-based best response. †Defined in the noted propositions.
expand (see Algorithm 1 and Fig. 1). In the complete phase, a meta-game consisting of all match-ups
of these joint policies is synthesized, with missing payoff entries in M completed through game
simulations. Next, in the solve phase, a meta-solverM computes a profile pi over the player policies
(e.g., Nash, α-Rank, or uniform distributions). Finally, in the expand phase, an oracle O computes at
least one new policy s′k for each player k ∈ [K], given profile pi. As other players’ policy spaces
S−k and profile pi−k are fixed, this phase involves solving a single-player optimization problem.
The new policies are appended to the respective players’ policy sets, and the algorithm iterates.
We use PSRO(M, O) to refer to the PSRO instance using meta-solverM and oracle O. Notably,
PSRO-based training for two-player symmetric games can be conducted using a single population of
policies that is shared by all players (i.e., Sk is identical for all k). Thus, we henceforth refer to two-
player symmetric games as ‘single-population games’, and more generally refer to games that require
player-specific policy populations as ‘multi-population games’. Recent investigations of PSRO have
solely focused on Nash-based meta-solvers and best-response-based oracles (Lanctot et al., 2017;
Balduzzi et al., 2019), with theory focused around the two-player zero-sum case. Unfortunately, these
guarantees do not hold in games beyond this regime, making investigation of alternative meta-solvers
and oracles critical for further establishing PSRO’s generalizability.
4 GENERALIZING PSRO THEORY
This section establishes theoretical properties of PSRO for several useful classes of general games.
We summarize our results in Table 1, giving a full exposition below.
4.1 ESTABLISHING CONVERGENCE TO α-RANK Player 2
A B C D X
Pl
ay
er
1
A 0 −φ 1 φ −ε
B φ 0 −φ2 1 −ε
C −1 φ2 0 −φ −ε
D −φ −1 φ 0 −ε
X ε ε ε ε 0
Table 2: Symmetric zero-sum game used to
analyze the behavior of PSRO in Example 1.
Here, 0 < ε 1 and φ 1.
It is well-known that PSRO(Nash, BR) will eventually
return an NE in two-player zero-sum games (McMahan
et al., 2003). In more general games, where Nash faces
the issues outlined earlier, α-Rank appears a promis-
ing meta-solver candidate as it applies to many-player,
general-sum games and has no selection problem. How-
ever, open questions remain regarding convergence
guarantees of PSRO when using α-Rank, and whether
standard BR oracles suffice for ensuring these guaran-
tees. We investigate these theoretical questions, namely,
whether particular variants of PSRO can converge to the α-Rank distribution for the underlying game.
A first attempt to establish convergence to α-Rank might involve running PSRO to convergence (until
the oracle returns a strategy already in the convex hull of the known strategies), using α-Rank as the
meta-solver, and a standard best response oracle. However, the following example shows that this
will not work in general for the single-population case (see Fig. B.5 for a step-by-step illustration).
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Example 1. Consider the symmetric zero-sum game specified in Table 2. As X is the sole sink
component of the game’s response graph (as illustrated in Fig. B.5a), the single-population α-Rank
distribution for this game puts unit mass on X . We now show that a PSRO algorithm that computes
best responses to the α-Rank distribution over the current strategy set need not recover strategy X ,
by computing directly the strategy sets of the algorithm initialized with the set {C}.
1. The initial strategy space consists only of the strategy C; the best response against C is D.
2. The α-Rank distribution over {C,D} puts all mass on D; the best response against D is A.
3. The α-Rank distribution over {C,D,A} puts all mass on A; the best response against A is B.
4. The α-Rank distribution over {C,D,A,B} puts mass (1/3, 1/3, 1/6, 1/6) on (A,B,C,D) respec-
tively. For φ sufficiently large, the payoff that C receives against B dominates all others, and
since B has higher mass than C in the α-Rank distribution, the best response is C.
Thus, PSRO(α-Rank, BR) leads to the algorithm terminating with strategy set {A,B,C,D} and not
discovering strategy X in the sink strongly-connected component.
This conclusion also holds in the multi-population case, as the following counterexample shows.
Example 2. Consider the game in Table 2, treating it now as a multi-population problem. It is
readily verified that the multi-population α-Rank distributions obtained by PSRO with initial strategy
sets consisting solely of C for each player are: (i) a Dirac delta at the joint strategy (C,C), leading
to best responses of D for both players; (ii) a Dirac delta at (D,D) leading to best responses of A
for both players; (iii) a Dirac delta at (A,A), leading to best responses of B for both players; and
finally (iv) a distribution over joint strategies of the 4×4 subgame induced by strategies A,B,C,D
that leads to a best response not equal to X; thus, the full α-Rank distribution is again not recovered.
4.2 A NEW RESPONSE ORACLE
The previous examples indicate that the use of standard best responses in PSRO may be the root
cause of the incompatibility with the α-Rank solution concept. Thus, we define the Preference-based
Best Response (PBR) oracle, which is more closely aligned with the dynamics defining α-Rank, and
which enables us to establish desired PSRO guarantees with respect to α-Rank.
Consider first the single-population case. Given an N -strategy population {s1, . . . , sN} and corre-
sponding meta-solver distribution (pii)Ni=1∈∆N , a PBR oracle is defined as any function satisfying
PBR
(∑
i piisi
) ⊆ arg maxσ∑i pii1 [M1(σ, si) >M2(σ, si)] , (1)
where the arg max returns the set of policies optimizing the objective, and the optimization is over
pure strategies in the underlying game. The intuition for the definition of PBR is that we would like
the oracle to return strategies that will receive high mass under α-Rank when added to the population;
objective (1) essentially encodes the probability flux that the vertex corresponding to σ would receive
in the random walk over the α-Rank response graph (see Section 2 or Appendix E for further details).
We demonstrate below that the use of the PBR resolves the issue highlighted in Example 1 (see
Fig. B.6 in Appendix B for an accompanying visual).
Example 3. Steps 1 to 3 of correspond exactly to those of Example 1. In step 4, the α-Rank
distribution over {C,D,A,B} puts mass (1/3, 1/3, 1/6, 1/6) on (A,B,C,D) respectively. A beats C
and D, thus its PBR score is 1/3. B beats A and D, thus its PBR score is 1/2. C beats B, its PBR
score is thus 1/3. D beats C, its PBR score is thus 1/6. Finally, X beats every other strategy, and
its PBR score is thus 1. Thus, there is only one strategy maximizing PBR, X , which is then chosen,
thereby recovering the SSCC of the game and the correct α-Rank distribution at the next timestep.
In the multi-population case, consider a population of N strategy profiles {s1, . . . , sN} and corre-
sponding meta-solver distribution (pii)Ni=1. Several meta-SSCCs may exist in the multi-population
α-Rank response graph. In this case, we run the PBR oracle for each meta-SSCC separately, as
follows. Suppose there are ` meta-SSCCs, and denote by pi(`) the distribution pi restricted to the `th
meta-SSCC, for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ L. The PBR for player k on the `th meta-SSCC is then defined by
PBRk
(∑
i pi
(`)
i si
) ⊆ arg maxσ∑i pi(`)i 1 [Mk(σ, s−ki ) >Mk(ski , s−ki )] . (2)
Thus, the PBR oracle generates one new strategy for each player for every meta-SSCC in the α-Rank
response graph; we return this full set of strategies and append to the policy space accordingly, as
5
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in Line 5 of Algorithm 1. Intuitively, this leads to a diversification of strategies introduced by the
oracle, as each new strategy need only perform well against a subset of prior strategies. This hints at
interesting links with the recently-introduced concept of rectified-Nash BR (Balduzzi et al., 2019),
which also attempts to improve diversity in PSRO, albeit only in two-player zero-sum games.
We henceforth denote PSRO(α-Rank, PBR) as α-PSRO for brevity. We next define α-CONV, an
approximate measure of convergence to α-Rank. We restrict discussion to the multi-population case
here, describing the single-population case in Appendix B.4. With the notation introduced above, we
define PBR-SCOREk(σ;pi, S) =
∑
i
∑
` pi
(`)
i 1
[
Mk(σ, s−ki ) >M
k(ski , s
−k
i )
]
, and
α-CONV =
∑
k maxσ PBR-SCORE
k(σ)−maxs∈Sk PBR-SCOREk(s) ,
where maxσ is taken over the pure strategies of the underlying game. Unfortunately, in
the multi-population case, a PBR-SCORE of 0 does not necessarily imply α-partial con-
vergence. We thus introduce a further measure, PCS-SCORE, defined by PCS-SCORE =
# of α-PSRO strategy profiles in the underlying game’s SSCCs
# of α-PSRO strategy profiles in meta-SSCCs , which assesses the quality of the α-PSRO population.
4.3 α-PSRO: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND CONNECTIONS TO NASH
We next study the theoretical properties of PSRO(α-Rank, PBR), which we henceforth refer to as
α-PSRO for brevity. We consider that α-PSRO has converged if no new strategy has been returned
by PBR for any player at the end of an iteration. Proofs of all results are provided in Appendix C.
Definition 1. A PSRO algorithm is said to converge α-fully (resp., α-partially) to an SSCC of the
underlying game if its strategy population contains the full SSCC (resp., a sub-cycle of the SSCC,
denoted a ‘sub-SSCC’) after convergence.
Definition 2. We also adapt PBR to be what we call novelty-bound by restricting the arg max in
Equation (1) to be over strategies not already included in the population with PBR-SCORE > 0.
In particular, the novelty-bound version of the PBR oracle is given by restricting the arg max appearing
in (2) to only be over strategies not already present in the population.
These definitions enable the following results for α-PSRO in the single- and multi-population cases.
Proposition 1. If at any point the population of α-PSRO contains a member of an SSCC of the game,
then α-PSRO will α-partially converge to that SSCC.
Proposition 2. If we constrain the PBR oracle used in α-PSRO to be novelty-bound, then α-PSRO
will α-fully converge to at least one SSCC of the game.
Stronger guarantees exist for two-players symmetric (i.e., single-population) games, though the
multi-population case encounters more issues, as follows.
Proposition 3. (Single-population) α-PSRO converges α-partially to the unique SSCC.
Proposition 4. (Multi-population) Without a novelty-bound oracle, there exist games for which
α-PSRO does not converge α-partially to any SSCC.
In Section 5, we further investigate convergence behavior beyond the conditions studied above. In
practice, we demonstrate that despite the negative result of Proposition 4, α-PSRO does significantly
increase the probability of converging to an SSCC, in contrast to PSRO(Nash, BR). Overall, we
have shown that for general-sum multi-player games, it is possible to give theoretical guarantees
for a version of PSRO driven by α-Rank in several circumstances. By contrast, using exact NE in
PSRO is intractable in general. In prior work, this motivated the use of approximate Nash solvers
generally based on the simulation of dynamical systems or regret minimization algorithms, both of
which generally require specification of several hyperparameters (e.g., simulation iterations, window
sizes for computing time-average policies, and entropy-injection rates), and a greater computational
burden than α-Rank to carry out the simulation in the first place.
Implementing the PBR Oracle Recall from Section 3 that the BR oracle inherently solves a single-
player optimization problem, permitting use of a single-agent RL algorithm as a BR approximator,
which is useful in practice. As noted in Section 4.1, however, there exist games where the BR
and PBR objectives are seemingly incompatible, preventing the use of standard RL agents for PBR
approximation. While exact PBR is computable in small-scale (e.g., normal-form) games, we next
consider more general games classes where PBR can also be approximated using standard RL agents.
6
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Figure 2: Oracle comparisons for randomly-generated games with varying player strategy space sizes
|Sk|. Top and bottom rows, respectively, correspond to 4- and 5-player games.
Definition 3. Objective A is ‘compatible’ with objective B if any solution to A is a solution to B.
Proposition 5. A constant-sum game is denoted as win-loss ifMk(s) ∈ {0, 1} for all k ∈ [K] and
s ∈ S. BR is compatible with PBR in win-loss games in the two-player single-population case.
Proposition 6. A symmetric two-player game is denoted monotonic if there exists a function f :
S → R and a non-decreasing function σ : R → R such that M1(s, ν) = σ(f(s) − f(ν)). BR is
compatible with PBR in monotonic games in the single-population case.
Finally, we next demonstrate that under certain conditions, there are strong connections between the
PBR objective defined above and the broader field of preference-based RL (Wirth et al., 2017).
Proposition 7. Consider symmetric win-loss games where outcomes between deterministic strategies
are deterministic. A preference-based RL agent (i.e., an agent aiming to maximize its probability of
winning against a distribution pi of strategies {s1, . . . , sN}) optimizes exactly the PBR objective (1).
Given this insight, we believe an important subject of future work will involve the use of preference-
based RL algorithms in implementing the PBR oracle for more general classes of games. We conclude
this section with some indicative results of the relationship between α-Rank and NE.
Proposition 8. For symmetric two-player zero-sum games where off-diagonal payoffs have equal
magnitude, all NE have support contained within that of the single-population α-Rank distribution.
Proposition 9. In a symmetric two-player zero-sum game, there exists an NE with support contained
within that of the α-Rank distribution.
For more general games, the link between α-Rank and Nash equilibria will likely require a more
complex description. We leave this for future work, providing additional discussion in Appendix B.3.
5 EVALUATION
We conduct evaluations on games of increasing complexity, extending beyond prior PSRO applications
that have focused on two-player zero-sum games. For experimental procedures, see Appendix D.
Oracle comparisons We evaluate here the performance of the BR and PBR oracles in games where
PBR can be exactly computed. We consider randomly generated, K-player, general-sum games
with increasing strategy space sizes, |Sk|. Figure 2 reports these results for the 4- and 5-player
instances (see Appendix D.3 for 2-3 player results). For each combination ofK and |Sk|, we generate
1e6 random games. We conduct 10 trials per game, in each trial running the BR and PBR oracles
starting from a random strategy in the corresponding response graph, then iteratively expanding
the population space until convergence. Importantly, this implies that the starting strategy may not
even be in an SSCC. As mentioned in Section 4.2, α-CONV and PCS-SCORE jointly characterize
the oracle behaviors in these multi-population settings. Figure 2a plots α-CONV for both oracles,
demonstrating that PBR outperforms BR in the sense that it captures more of the game SSCCs.
Figures 2b and 2c, respectively, plot the PCS-SCORE for BR and PBR over all game instances. The
PCS-SCORE here is typically either (a) greater than 95%, or (b) less than 5%, and otherwise rarely
7
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Figure 3: Results for 2-player poker domains.
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Figure 4: Results for poker domains with more than 2 players.
between 5% to 95%. For all values of |Sk|, PBR consistently discovers a larger proportion of the
α-Rank support in contrast to BR, serving as useful validation of the theoretical results of Section 4.3.
Meta-solver comparisons We consider next the standard benchmarks of Kuhn and Leduc poker
(Kuhn, 1950; Southey et al., 2005; Lanctot et al., 2019). We detail these domains in Appendix D.2,
noting here that both are K-player, although Leduc is significantly more complex than Kuhn. We first
consider two-player instances of Kuhn and Leduc poker, permitting use of an exact Nash meta-solver.
Figure 3 compares the NASHCONV of PSRO(M, BR) for various meta-solverM choices. In Kuhn
poker (Fig. 3a), the α-Rank, Nash, and the Projected Replicator Dynamics (PRD) meta-solvers
converge essentially at the same rate towards zero NASHCONV, in contrast to the slower rate of
the Uniform meta-solver. As noted in Lanctot et al. (2017), PSRO(Uniform, BR) corresponds to
Fictitious Play (Brown, 1951) and is thus guaranteed to find an NE in such instances of two-player
zero-sum games. Its slower convergence rate is explained by the assignment of uniform mass across
all policies s ∈ S, implying that PSRO essentially wastes resources on training the oracle to beat even
poor-performing strategies. Notably, the similar performance of α-Rank and Nash serves as empirical
evidence that α-Rank can be applied competitively even in the two-player zero-sum setting, while
also showing great promise to be deployed in broader settings where Nash is no longer tractable.
We next consider significantly larger variants of Kuhn and Leduc Poker involving more than two
players, extending beyond the reach of prior PSRO results (Lanctot et al., 2017). Figure 4 visualizes
the NASHCONV of PSRO using the various meta-solvers (with the exception of an exact Nash
solver, due to its intractability in these instances). In all instances of Kuhn Poker, α-Rank and
PRD show competitive convergence rates. In 3-player Leduc poker, however, α-Rank shows fastest
convergence, with Uniform following throughout most of training and PRD eventually reaching a
similar NASHCONV. Several key insights can be made here. First, computation of an approximate
Nash via PRD involves simulation of the associated replicator dynamics, which can be chaotic
(Palaiopanos et al., 2017) even in two-player two-strategy games, making it challenging to determine
when PRD has suitably converged. Second, the addition of the projection step in PRD severs its
connection with NE; the theoretical properties of PRD were left open in Lanctot et al. (2017), leaving
it without any guarantees. These limitations go beyond theoretical, manifesting in practice, e.g., in
Fig. 4d, where PRD is outperformed by even the uniform meta-solver for many iterations. Given
these issues, we take a first (and informal) step towards analyzing PRD in Appendix F. For α-Rank,
by contrast, we both establish theoretical properties in Section 4, and face no simulation-related
challenges as its computation involves solving of a linear system, even in the general-sum many-player
case (Omidshafiei et al., 2019), thus establishing it as a favorable and general PSRO meta-solver.
MuJoCo Soccer While the key objective of this paper is to take a first step in establishing a
theoretically-grounded framework for PSRO-based training of agents in many-player settings, an
exciting question regards the behaviors of the proposed α-Rank-based PSRO algorithm in complex
domains where function-approximation-based policies need to be relied upon. In Appendix G, we
take a first step towards conducting this investigation in the MuJoCo soccer domain introduced in
Liu et al. (2019). We remark that these results, albeit interesting, are primarily intended to lay the
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foundation for use of α-Rank as a meta-solver in complex many agent domains where RL agents
serve as useful oracles, warranting additional research and analysis to make conclusive insights.
6 DISCUSSION
This paper studied variants of PSRO using α-Rank as a meta-solver, which were shown to be
competitive with Nash-based PSRO in zero-sum games, and scale effortlessly to general-sum many-
player games, in contrast to Nash-based PSRO. We believe there are many interesting directions
for future work, including how uncertainty in the meta-solver distribution, informed by recent
developments in dealing with incomplete information in games (Reeves and Wellman, 2004; Walsh
et al., 2003; Rowland et al., 2019), can be used to inform the selection of new strategies to be added
to populations. In summary, we strongly believe that the theoretical and empirical results established
in this paper will play a key role in scaling up multiagent training in general settings.
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APPENDICES
A MOST CLOSELY RELATED WORK
We discuss the most closely related work along two axes. We start with PSRO-based research
and some multiagent deep RL work that focuses on training of networks in various multiagent
settings. Then we continue with related work that uses evolutionary dynamics (α-Rank and replicator
dynamics) as a solution concept to examine underlying behavior of multiagent interactions using
meta-games.
Policy-space response oracles (Lanctot et al., 2017) unify many existing approaches to multiagent
learning. Notable examples include fictitious play (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951), independent
reinforcement learning (Matignon et al., 2012) and the double oracle algorithm (McMahan et al.,
2003). PSRO also relies, fundamentally, on principles from empirical game-theoretic analysis
(EGTA) (Walsh et al., 2002; Phelps et al., 2004; Tuyls et al., 2018; Wellman, 2006; Vorobeychik,
2010; Wiedenbeck and Wellman, 2012; Wiedenbeck et al., 2014).
PSRO allows the multiagent learning problem to be decomposed into a sequence of single-agent
learning problems. A wide variety of other approaches that deal with the multiagent learning problem
without this reduction are also available, such as Multiagent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradients
(MADDPG) (Lowe et al., 2017), Counterfactual Multiagent Policy Gradients (COMA) (Foerster et al.,
2018), Differentiable Inter-Agent Learning (DIAL) (Foerster et al., 2016), Hysteretic Deep Recurrent
Q-learning (Omidshafiei et al., 2017), and lenient Multiagent Deep Reinforcement Learning (Palmer
et al., 2018).
α-Rank was introduced by Omidshafiei et al. (2019) as a scalable dynamic alternative to Nash
equilibria that can be applied in general-sum, many-player games and is capable of capturing the
underlying multiagent evolutionary dynamics. Concepts from evolutionary dynamics have long been
used in analysis of multiagent interactions from a meta-game standpoint (Walsh et al., 2002; Tuyls
and Parsons, 2007; Hennes et al., 2013; Bloembergen et al., 2015; Tuyls et al., 2018).
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B EXAMPLES
B.1 FURTHER EXPOSITION OF EXAMPLES 1 AND 2
Player 2
A B C D X
Player 1
A 0 −φ 1 φ −ε
B φ 0 −φ2 1 −ε
C −1 φ2 0 −φ −ε
D −φ −1 φ 0 −ε
X ε ε ε ε 0
(a) Overview. Full payoff table on left, full response graph on right, with values over directed edges indicating
the payoff gained by deviating from one strategy to another.
Player 2
A B C D X
Player 1
A 0 −φ 1 φ −ε
B φ 0 −φ2 1 −ε
C −1 φ2 0 −φ −ε
D −φ −1 φ 0 −ε
X ε ε ε ε 0
(b) Consider an initial strategy space consisting only of the strategy C; the best response against C is D.
Player 2
A B C D X
Player 1
A 0 −φ 1 φ −ε
B φ 0 −φ2 1 −ε
C −1 φ2 0 −φ −ε
D −φ −1 φ 0 −ε
X ε ε ε ε 0
(c) The α-Rank distribution over {C,D} puts all mass on D; the best response against D is A.
Player 2
A B C D X
Player 1
A 0 −φ 1 φ −ε
B φ 0 −φ2 1 −ε
C −1 φ2 0 −φ −ε
D −φ −1 φ 0 −ε
X ε ε ε ε 0
(d) The α-Rank distribution over {C,D,A} puts all mass on A; the best response against A is B.
Player 2
A B C D X
Player 1
A 0 −φ 1 φ −ε
B φ 0 −φ2 1 −ε
C −1 φ2 0 −φ −ε
D −φ −1 φ 0 −ε
X ε ε ε ε 0
(e) The α-Rank distribution over {C,D,A,B} puts mass (1/3, 1/3, 1/6, 1/6) on (A,B,C,D) respectively. For
φ sufficiently large, the payoff that C receives against B dominates all others, and since B has higher mass than
C in the α-Rank distribution, the best response is C.
Figure B.5: Example 1 with oracle O = BR. In each step above, the α-Rank support is highlighted
by the light green box of the payoff table, and the BR strategy against it in bold, dark green.
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Player 2
A B C D X
Player 1
A 0 −φ 1 φ −ε
B φ 0 −φ2 1 −ε
C −1 φ2 0 −φ −ε
D −φ −1 φ 0 −ε
X ε ε ε ε 0
(e) The α-Rank distribution over {C,D,A,B} puts mass (1/3, 1/3, 1/6, 1/6) on (A,B,C,D) respectively. A
beats C and D, and therefore its PBR score is 1/3. B beats A and D, therefore its PBR score is 1/2. C beats B,
its PBR score is therefore 1/3. D beats C, its PBR score is therefore 1/6. Finally, X beats every other strategy,
and its PBR score is thus 1. There is only one strategy maximizing PBR, X , which is then chosen, and the SSCC
of the game, recovered.
Figure B.6: Example 1 with oracle O = PBR. Steps (a) to (d) are not shown as they are identical to
their analogs in Fig. B.5.
B.2 EXAMPLE BEHAVIOR OF PSRO(NASH, BR)
A first attempt to establish convergence to α-Rank might involve running PSRO to convergence (until
the oracle returns a strategy already in the convex hull of the known strategies), and then running
α-Rank on the resulting meta-game. However, the following provides a counterexample to this
approach when using either PSRO(Nash, BR) or PSRO(Uniform, BR).
Player 2
A B X
Player 1
A 0 1 ε
B 1 0 −ε
X −ε ε 0
(a) Example 4
Player 2
A B
Player 1
A -1 1
B 1 -1
X −ε −ε/2
(b) Example 5
Table 3: Illustrative games used to analyze the behavior of PSRO in Example 4. Here, 0 < ε 1.
The first game is symmetric, whilst the second is zero-sum. Both tables specify the payoff to Player 1
under each strategy profile.
Example 4. Consider the two-player symmetric game specified in Table 3a. The sink strongly-
connected component of the single-population response graph (and hence the α-Rank distribution)
contains all three strategies, but all NE are supported on {A,B} only, and the best response to a
strategy supported on {A,B} is another strategy supported on {A,B}. Thus, the single-population
variant of PSRO, using M ∈ {Nash,Uniform} with initial strategies contained in {A,B} will
terminate before discovering strategy X; the full α-Rank distribution will thus not be recovered.
Example 5. Consider the two-player zero-sum game specified in Table 3b. All strategy profiles recieve
non-zero probability in the multi-population α-Rank distribution. However, the Nash equilibrium
over the game restricted to actions A,B for each player has a unique Nash equilibrium of (1/2, 1/2).
Player 1’s best response to this Nash is to play some mixture of A and B, and therefore strategy X is
not recovered by PSRO(Nash, BR) in this case, and so the full α-Rank distribution will thus not be
recovered.
B.3 COUNTEREXAMPLES: α-RANK VS. NASH SUPPORT
The Game of Chicken The Game of Chicken provides an example where the support of α-Rank-
in the multipopulation case - does not include the full support of Nash Equilibria.
This game has three Nash equilibria: Two pure, (D,C) and (C,D), and one mixed, where the population
plays Dare with probability 13 . Nevertheless, α-rank only puts weight on (C,D) and (D,C), effectively
not putting weight on the full mixed-nash support.
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Player 2
D C
Player 1 D (0, 0) (7, 2)C (2, 7) (6, 6)
Table 4: Game of Chicken payoff table
Prisoner’s Dilemma The Prisoner’s Dilemma provides a counterexample that the support of α-
Rank- in the multi-population case - does not include the full support of correlated equilibria.
Player 2
D C
Player 1 D (0, 0) (3,−1)C (−1, 3) (2, 2)
Table 5: Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff table
This game has correlated equilibria that include (C,D), (D,C) and (C,C) in their support; nevertheless,
α-Rank only puts weight on (D,D), effectively being fully disjoint from the support of the correlated
equilibria.
B.4 SINGLE-POPULATION α-CONV
In analogy with the multi-population definition in Section 4.2, we define a single-population ver-
sion of α-CONV. We start by defining the single-population version of PBR-Score, given by
PBR-SCORE(σ;pi, S) =
∑
i pii1
[
M1(σ, si) >M
2(σi, si)
]
. The single-population α-CONV is
then defined as
α-CONV = max
σ
PBR-SCORE(σ)−max
s∈S
PBR-SCORE(s) ,
where maxσ is taken over the pure strategies of the underlying game.
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C PROOFS
C.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proposition 1. If at any point the population of α-PSRO contains a member of an SSCC of the game,
then α-PSRO will α-partially converge to that SSCC.
Proof. Suppose that a member of one of the underlying game’s SSCCs appears in the α-PSRO
population. This member will induce its own meta-SSCC in the meta-game’s response graph. At least
one of the members of the underlying game’s corresponding SSCC will thus always have positive
probability under the α-Rank distribution for the meta-game, and the PBR oracle for this meta-SSCC
will always return a member of the underlying game’s SSCC. If the PBR oracle returns a member of
the underlying SSCC already in the PSRO population, we claim that the corresponding meta-SSCC
already contains a cycle of the underlying SSCC. To see this, note that if the meta-SSCC does not
contain a cycle, it must be a singleton. Either this singleton is equal to the full SSCC of the underlying
game (in which we have α-fully converged), or it is not, in which case the PBR oracle must return a
new strategy from the underlying SSCC, contradicting our assumption that it has terminated.
C.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proposition 2. If we constrain the PBR oracle used in α-PSRO to be novelty-bound, then α-PSRO
will α-fully converge to at least one SSCC of the game.
Proof. Suppose that α-PSRO has converged, and consider a meta-SSCC. Since α-PSRO has con-
verged, it follows that each strategy profile of the meta-SSCC is an element of an SSCC of the
underlying game. Any strategy profile in this SSCC which is not in the meta-SSCC will obtain a
positive value for the PBR objective, and since α-PSRO has converged, there can be no such strategy
profile. Thus, the meta-SSCC contains every strategy profile contained within the corresponding
SSCC of the underlying game, and therefore conclude that α-PSRO α-fully converges to an SSCC of
the underlying game.
C.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proposition 3. (Single-population) α-PSRO converges α-partially to the unique SSCC.
Proof. The uniqueness of the SSCC follows from the fact that in the single-population case, the
response graph is fully-connected. Suppose at termination of α-PSRO, the α-PSRO population
contains no strategy within the SSCC, and let s be a strategy in the SSCC. We claim that s attains a
higher value for the objective defining the PBR oracle than any strategy in the α-PSRO population,
which contradicts the fact that α-PSRO has terminated. To complete this argument, we note that
by virtue of s being in the SSCC, we haveM1(s, s′) >M1(s′, s) for all s′ outside the SSCC, and
in particular for all s′ ∈ S, thus the PBR objective for s is 1. In contrast, for any si ∈ S, the PBR
objective for si is upper-bounded by 1−pii. If pii > 0, then this shows si is not selected by the oracle,
since the objective value is lower than that of s. If pii = 0, then the objective value for si is 0, and so
an SSCC member will always have a maximal PBR score of 1 against a population not composed of
any SSCC member, and all members of that population have < 1 PBR scores. Consequently, single-
population α-PSRO cannot terminate before it has encountered an SSCC member. By Proposition 1,
the proposition is therefore proven.
C.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proposition 4. (Multi-population) Without a novelty-bound oracle, there exist games for which
α-PSRO does not converge α-partially to any SSCC.
Proof. We exhibit a specific counterexample to the claim. Consider the three-player, three-strategy
game with response graph illustrated in Fig. C.7; note that we do not enumerate all strategy profiles
not appearing in the SSCC for space and clarity reasons. The sequence of updates undertaken by
α-PSRO in this game is illustrated in Fig. C.7a; whilst the singleton strategy profile (3, 2, 3) forms
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the unique SSCC for this game, α-PSRO terminates before reaching it, which concludes the proof.
The steps taken by the algorithm are described below; again, we do not enumerate all strategy profiles
not appearing in the SSCC for space and clarity reasons.
1. Begin with strategies [[2], [1], [1]] in the α-PSRO population (Player 1 only has access to strategy
2, Players 2 and 3 only have access to strategy 1)
2. The PBR to (2,1,1) for player 2 is 2, and no other player has a PBR on this round. We add
2 to the strategy space of player 2, which changes the space of available joint strategies to
[(2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1)].
3. α-Rank puts all its mass on (2,2,1). The PBR to (2,2,1) for player 3 is 2, and no other player has a
PBR on this round. We add strategy 2 to player 3’s strategy space, which changes the space of
available joint strategies to [(2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2)].
4. α-Rank puts all its mass on (2,2,2). The PBR to (2,2,2) for player 1 is 1, and no other player has a
PBR on this round. We add strategy 1 to player 1’s strategy space, which changes the space of
available joint strategies to [(1, 1, 1), (1, 2, 1), (1, 2, 2), (2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2)].
5. Define σ as the α-Rank probabilities of the meta-game. Player 1 playing strategy 2 has a PBR
score of σ((1, 1, 1)) + σ((1, 2, 1)), and the same player playing strategy 3 has a PBR score of
σ((1, 2, 1)), which is lower than the PBR Score of playing strategy 2. No other player has a valid
PBR for this round, and therefore, α-PSRO terminates.
C.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proposition 5. A constant-sum game is denoted as win-loss ifMk(s) ∈ {0, 1} for all k ∈ [K] and
s ∈ S. BR is compatible with PBR in win-loss games in the two-player single-population case.
Proof. We manipulate the best-response objective as follows:
M1(ν,pi) =
∑
s∈S
pi(s)M1(ν, s)
=
∑
s∈S
pi(s)1[M1(ν, s) >M2(ν, s)] .
Noting that the final line is the single-population PBR objective, we are done.
C.6 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Proposition 6. A symmetric two-player game is denoted monotonic if there exists a function f :
S → R and a non-decreasing function σ : R → R such that M1(s, ν) = σ(f(s) − f(ν)). BR is
compatible with PBR in monotonic games in the single-population case.
Proof. Rewriting the objectives given that the game is monotonic, we have that the value-based
objective becomes
K∑
k=1
pikM
1(s, sk) =
K∑
k=1
pikσ(f(s)− f(sk)) .
Given the fact that the only condition we have on σ is its non-decreasing character, this objective
does not reduce to maximizing f(s) in the general case.
The objective for PBR is
K∑
k=1
pik1[M
1(s, sk) >M
2(s, sk)] =
K∑
k=1
pik1[σ(f(s)− f(sk)) > σ(f(sk)− f(s))]
Since σ is non-decreasing,
σ(f(s)− f(sk)) > σ(f(sk)− f(s)) ⇒ f(s) > f(sk)
17
Preprint.
1,2,1
1,1,1
3,2,1
3,2,3
2,1,1
1,1,2
2,2,1
2,2,2
1,2,2
20,20,20
4,3,3
2,2,2
3,3,3 1,5,1
3,3,3
10,10,1
1,1,5
5,1,5
(a)
2,1,1
3,3,3
(b)
2,1,1
2,2,1
3,3,3
10,10,1
(c)
2,1,1
2,2,1
2,2,2
3,3,3
10,10,1
1,1,5
(d)
2,1,1
2,2,1
2,2,2
1,2,2
3,3,3
10,10,1
1,1,5
5,1,5
(e)
1,2,1
1,1,1
1,1,2
1,2,2
2,2,2
3,3,3 1,5,1
3,3,3
10,10,1
1,1,5
5,1,5
2,2,1
2,2,2
2,1,1
(f)
Figure C.7: The three-player, three-strategy game serving as a counterexample in the proof of
Proposition 4. Strategy profiles are illustrated by gray circles, with payoffs listed beneath. All strategy
profiles not pictured are assumed to be dominated, and are therefore irrelevant in determining whether
α-PSRO reaches an SSCC for this game.
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and conversely,
f(s) > f(sk) ⇒ σ(f(s)− f(sk)) ≥ σ(f(sk)− f(s))
Without loss of generality, we reorder the strategies such that if i < k, f(si) ≤ f(sk).
Let sv maximize the value objective. Therefore, by monotonicity, sv maximizes σ(f(s)− f(sK)).
Three possibilities then ensue.
If there exists s such that
σ(f(s)− f(sK)) > σ(f(sK)− f(s))
then
σ(f(sv)− f(sK)) > σ(f(sK)− f(sv))
since sv maximizes σ(f(s)− f(sK)) and σ is non-decreasing. Consequently sv maximizes the PBR
objective. Indeed, let us remark that for all k ≤ K, we have that
σ(f(sv)− f(sk)) > σ(f(sk)− f(sv))
since
σ(f(sv)− f(sk)) ≥ σ(f(sv)− f(sK)) > σ(f(sK)− f(sv)) ≥ σ(f(sk)− f(sv))
Else, if there does not exist any policy s such that σ(f(s)− f(sK)) > σ(f(sK)− f(s)), that is, for
all s,
σ(f(s)− f(sK)) ≤ σ(f(sK)− f(s))
Since sK is a possible solution to the value objective,
σ(f(sv)− f(sK)) = σ(f(sK)− f(sv))
Let n be the integer such that
sn = arg max{f(sk), sk ∈ Population | ∃s s.t. σ(f(s)− f(sk)) > σ(f(sk)− f(s))}
If sn exists, then we have that for all si such that f(si) > f(sn),
σ(f(sv)− f(si)) = σ(f(si)− f(sv))
The PBR objective is
K∑
k=1
pik1[σ(f(s)− f(sk)) > σ(f(sk)− f(s))]
which, according to our assumptions, is equivalent to
n∑
k=1
pik1[σ(f(s)− f(sk)) > σ(f(sk)− f(s))]
We know that for all i ≤ n, σ(f(sv)− f(si)) > σ(f(si)− f(sv)), and therefore, sv maximizes the
PBR objective.
Finally, if sn doesn’t exist, then any policy is solution to the PBR objective, and therefore sv is.
C.7 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proposition 7. Consider symmetric win-loss games where outcomes between deterministic strategies
are deterministic. A preference-based RL agent (i.e., an agent aiming to maximize its probability of
winning against a distribution pi of strategies {s1, . . . , sN}) optimizes exactly the PBR objective (1).
Proof. Commencing with the above preference-based RL objective, we calculate as follows,
arg max
σ
P
(
σ beats
N∑
i=1
piisi
)
= arg max
σ
Ei [P(σ beats si|index i selected)]
= arg max
σ
N∑
i=1
piiP(σ beats si)
= arg max
σ
N∑
i=1
pii1[σ receives a positive expected payoff against si]
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with the final equality whenever game outcomes between two deterministic strategies are deterministic.
Note that this is precisely the PBR objective (1).
C.8 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
Proposition 8. For symmetric two-player zero-sum games where off-diagonal payoffs have equal
magnitude, all NE have support contained within that of the single-population α-Rank distribution.
Proof. In the single-population case, the support of the α-Rank distribution is simply the (unique)
sink strongly-connected component of the response graph (uniqueness follows from the fact that
the response graph, viewed as an undirected graph, is fully-connected). We will now argue that for
a strategy s in the sink strongly-connected component and a strategy z outside the sink strongly-
connected component, we have∑
a∈S
pi(a)M1(s, a) >
∑
a∈S
pi(a)M1(z, a) , (3)
This inequality states that when an opponent plays according to pi, the expected payoff to the row
player is greater if they defect to s whenever they would have played z. This implies that if a supposed
symmetric Nash equilibrium contains a strategy z outside the sink strongly-connected component
in its support, then it could receive higher reward by playing s instead, which contradicts the fact
that it is an NE. We show (3) by proving a stronger result — namely, that s dominates z as strategies.
Firstly, since s is the sink strongly-connected component and z is not, s beats z, and soM1(s, z) >
M1(s, s) = M1(z, z) >M1(z, s). Next, if a 6∈ {s, z} is in the sink strongly-connected component,
then a beats z, and so M1(s, a) > M1(z, a) if s beats a, and M1(s, a) = M1(z, a) otherwise.
Finally, if a 6= s, z is not in the sink strongly-connected component, thenM1(s, a) = M1(z, a) is z
beats a, andM1(s, a) >M1(z, a) otherwise. Thus, (3) is proven, and the result follows.
C.9 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
Proposition 9. In a symmetric two-player zero-sum game, there exists an NE with support contained
within that of the α-Rank distribution.
Proof. Consider the restriction of the game to the strategies contained in the sink strongly-connected
component of the original game. Let pi be an NE for this restricted game, and consider this as a
distribution over all strategies in the original game (putting 0 mass on strategies outside the sink
component). We argue that this is an NE for the full game, and the statement follows. To see this, note
that since any strategy outside the sink strongly-connected component receives a non-positive payoff
when playing against a strategy in the sink strongly-connected component, and that for at least one
strategy in the sink strongly-connected component, this payoff is negative. Considering the payoffs
available to the row player when the column player plays according to pi, we observe that the expected
payoff for any strategy outside the sink strongly-connected component is negative, since every strategy
in the sink strongly-connected component beats the strategy outside the component. The payoff when
defecting to a strategy in the sink strongly-connected component must be non-positive, since pi is an
NE for the restricted game.
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D ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON EXPERIMENTS
D.1 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Although the underlying Kuhn and Leduc poker games are stochastic (due to random initial card
deals), the associated meta-games are essentially deterministic (as, given enough game simulations,
the mean payoffs are fixed). The subsequent PSRO updates are, thus, also deterministic. Despite this,
we report averages over 2 runs per PSROM, primarily to capture stochasticity due to differences in
machine-specific rounding errors that occur due to the distributed computational platforms we run
these experiments on.
D.2 DOMAIN DESCRIPTIONS
Algorithms 2 to 4 provide an overview of the procedure we use to randomly-generate normal-form
games for the oracle comparisons visualized in Fig. 2.
Algorithm 2 GenerateTransitive(Actions, Players, meanvalue = [0.0, 1.0], meanprobability = [0.5, 0.5],
var = 0.1)
1: T = []
2: for Player k do
3: Initialize fk = [0] ∗ Actions
4: for Action a ≤ Actions do
5: Randomly sample mean µ from meanvalue according to meanprobability
6: fk[a] ∼ N (µ, var)
7: for Player k do
8: T [k] = fk − 1|Players|−1
∑
i 6=k fi
9: Return T
Algorithm 3 GenerateCyclic(Actions, Players, var = 0.4)
1: C = []
2: for Player k do
3: Initialize C[k] ∼ N (0, var), Shape(C[k]) = (ActionsFirst Player, . . . ,ActionsLast Player)
4: for Player k do
5: Sum =
∑
Actions ai of all player i6=k C[k][a1, . . . , ak−1, : , ak+1, ...]
6: Shape(Sum) = (1, . . . , 1,ActionsPlayer k, 1, . . . , 1)
7: C[k] = C[k]− Sum
8: Return C
Algorithm 4 General Normal Form Games Generation(Actions, Players)
1: Generate matrix lists T = GenerateTransitive(Actions, Players), C = GenerateCyclic(Actions,
Players)
2: Return [T [k] + C[k] for Player k]
K-player Kuhn poker is played with a deck of K + 1 cards. Each player starts with 2 chips and 1
face-down card, and antes 1 chip to play. Players either bet (raise/call) or fold iteratively, until each
player is either in (has contributed equally to the pot) or has folded. Amongst the remaining players,
the one with the highest-ranked card wins the pot. Leduc Poker, in comparison, has a significantly
larger state-space. Players in Leduc have unlimited chips, receive 1 face-down card, ante 1 chip to
play, with subsequent bets limited to 2 and 4 chips in rounds 1 and 2. A maximum of two raises are
allowed in each round, and a public card is revealed before the second round.
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D.3 ADDITIONAL ORACLE COMPARISON RESULTS
We present additional oracle comparisons in Fig. D.8.
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Figure D.8: Oracle comparisons for randomly-generated normal-form games with varying player
strategy space sizes |Sk|. The rows, in order, correspond to 2- to 5-player games.
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E α-RANK IN DETAIL
In this section we give further details of α-Rank; for a full description, see Omidshafiei et al. (2019).
Essentially α-Rank defines a directed response graph over the pure strategy profiles of the game under
study, by indicating when a player has an incentive to make a unilateral deviation from their current
strategy. An irreducible (noisy) random walk over this graph is then defined, and the strategy profile
rankings are obtained by ordering the masses of this Markov chain’s unique invariant distribution pi.
The Markov transition matrix C that specifies this random walk is defined as follows for the multi-
population case; see Omidshafiei et al. (2019) for the single-population case. Consider a pure strategy
profile s ∈ S, and let σ = (σk, s−k) be the pure strategy profile which is equal to s, except for player
k, which uses strategy σk ∈ Sk instead of sk. Let Cs,σ denote the transition probability from s to σ,
and Cs,s the self-transition probability of s, with each defined as:
Cs,σ =
{
η
1−exp(−α(Mk(σ)−Mk(s)))
1−exp(−αm(Mk(σ)−Mk(s))) ifM
k(σ) 6= Mk(s)
η
m otherwise ,
Cs,s = 1−
∑
k∈[K]
σ|σk∈Sk\{sk}
Cs,σ ,
where η = (
∑
l(|Sl| − 1))−1. If two strategy profiles s and s′ differ in more than one player’s
strategy, then Cs,s′ = 0. Here α ≥ 0 and m ∈ N are parameters to be specified; the form of
this transition probability is described by evolutionary dynamics models from evolutionary game
theory and is explained in more detail in Omidshafiei et al. (2019). Large values of α correspond to
higher selection pressure in the evolutionary model under consideration; the version of α-Rank used
throughout this paper corresponds to the limiting invariant distribution as α→∞, under which only
strategy profiles appearing in the sink strongly-connected components of the response graph can have
positive mass.
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F TOWARDS THEORETICAL GUARANTEES FOR THE PROJECTED REPLICATOR
DYNAMICS
Computing Nash equilibria is intractable for general games and can suffer from a selection problem
(Daskalakis et al., 2009); therefore, it quickly becomes computationally intractable to employ an
exact Nash meta-solver in the inner loop of a PSRO algorithm. To get around this, Lanctot et al.
(2017) use regret minimization algorithms to attain an approximate correlated equilibrium (which
is guaranteed to be an approximate Nash equilibrium under certain conditions on the underlying
game, such as two-player zero-sum). A dynamical system from evolutionary game theory that also
converges to equilibria under certain conditions is the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978;
Schuster and Sigmund, 1983; Cressman and Tao, 2014; Bloembergen et al., 2015), which defines a
dynamical system over distributions of strategies (piks (t) | k ∈ [K], s ∈ Sk), given by
p˙iks (t) = pi
k
s (t)
[
Mk(s,pi−k(t))−Mk(pik(t))] , for all k ∈ [K], s ∈ Sk , (4)
with an arbitrary initial condition. Lanctot et al. (2017) introduced a variant of replicator dynamics,
termed projected replicator dynamics (PRD), which projects the flow of the system so that each
distribution pik(t) lies in the set ∆γ
Sk
= {pi ∈ ∆Sk | pis ≥ γ/(|Sk| + 1), ∀s ∈ Sk}; see, e.g.,
Nagurney and Zhang (2012) for properties of such projected dynamical systems. This heuristically
enforces additional “exploration” relative to standard replicator dynamics, and was observed to
provide strong empirical results when used as a meta-solver within PSRO. However, the introduction
of projection potentially severs the connection between replicator dynamics and Nash equilibria, and
the theoretical game-theoretic properties of PRD were left open in Lanctot et al. (2017).
Here, we take a first step towards investigating theoretical guarantees for PRD. Specifically, we
highlight a possible connection between α-Rank, the calculation of which requires no simulation,
and a constrained variant of PRD, which we denote the ‘single-mutation PRD’ (or s-PRD), leaving
formal investigation of this connection for future work.
Specifically, s-PRD is a dynamical system over distributions (piks (t)|k ∈ [K], s ∈ Sk) that follows
the replicator dynamics (equation 4), with initial condition restricted so that each pik0 lies on the
1-skeleton ∆(1)
Sk
= {pi ∈ ∆Sk |
∑
s∈Sk 1pis 6=0 ≤ 2}. Further, whenever a strategy distribution
pikt enters a δ-corner of the simplex, defined by ∆
[δ]
Sk
= {pi ∈ ∆(1)
Sk
| ∃s ∈ Sk s.t. pis ≥ 1 − δ},
the non-zero element of pik(t) with mass at most δ is replaced with a uniformly randomly chosen
strategy after a random time distributed according to Exp(µ), for some small µ > 0. This concludes
the description of s-PRD. We note at this stage that s-PRD defines, essentially, a dynamical system
on the 1-skeleton (or edges) of the simplex, with random mutations towards a uniformly-sampled
randomly strategy profile s at the simplex vertices. At a high-level, this bears a close resemblance to
the finite-population α-Rank dynamics defined in Omidshafiei et al. (2019); moreover, we note that
the connection between s-PRD and true α-Rank dynamics becomes even more evident when taking
into account the correspondence between the standard replicator dynamics and α-Rank that is noted
in Omidshafiei et al. (2019, Theorem 2.1.4).
We conclude by noting a major limitation of both s-PRD and PRD, which can limit their practical
applicability even assuming a game-theoretic grounding can be proven for either. Specifically, with
all such solvers, simulation of a dynamical system is required to obtain an approximate equilibrium,
which may be costly in itself. Moreover, their dynamics can be chaotic even for simple instances
of two-player two-strategy games (Palaiopanos et al., 2017). In practice, the combination of these
two limitations may completely shatter the convergence properties of these algorithms in practice,
in the sense that the question of how long to wait until convergence becomes increasingly difficult
(and computationally expensive) to answer. By contrast, α-Rank does not rely on such simulations,
thereby avoiding these empirical issues.
We conclude by remarking again that, albeit informal, these results indicate a much stronger theoretical
connection between α-Rank and standard PRD that may warrant future investigation.
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G MUJOCO SOCCER EXPERIMENT
While the key objective of this paper is to take a first step in establishing a theoretically-grounded
framework for PSRO-based training of agents in many-player settings, an exciting question concerns
the behaviors of the proposed α-Rank-based PSRO algorithm in complex domains where function-
approximation-based policies need to be relied upon for generalizable task execution. In this section,
we take a preliminary step towards conducting this investigation, focusing in particular on the MuJoCo
soccer domain introduced in Liu et al. (2019) (refer to https://github.com/deepmind/
dm_control/tree/master/dm_control/locomotion/soccer for the corresponding
domain code).
In particular, we conduct initial experiments comparing the performance of PSRO(α-Rank, RL) and
PSRO(Uniform, RL), where we use an RL-agent as an oracle that approximates the best-response.
For each of the two PSRO variants considered, we compose a hierarchical training procedure
composed of two levels.
At the low-level, which focuses on simulations of the underlying MuJoCo soccer game itself, we
consider a collection of 8 reinforcement learners (which we call agents). We compose teams
corresponding to 3 clones of each agent (i.e., 8 homogeneous teams in total) and evaluate the all
pairwise team match-ups. Note that this yields a 2-player (team vs. team) meta-game, with payoffs
corresponding to the average win-rates of each team when pitted against another.
At the high-level, which corresponds to PSRO-based training for the players, we use the standard
PSRO procedures outlined in this paper; i.e., we compute the meta-distribution, and expand the
meta-population by 8 policies (corresponding to the 8 RL agents).
Note that we train the PSRO(α-Rank, RL) and PSRO(Uniform, RL) agents independently (i.e., the
two populations never interact with one another). Following training, however, we compare the
effective performance of these two PSRO variants by pitting their trained agents (8 each) against one
another, and recording the average win rates. These results are reported in Fig. G.9.
We conclude by remarking that these results, although interesting, primarily are intended to lay the
foundation for use of α-Rank as a meta-solver in complex many agent domains where RL agents
serve as useful oracles; additional, more extensive research and analysis is necessary to make these
results conclusive in domains such as MuJoCo soccer. We plan to carry out several experiments along
these lines in future work.
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Figure G.9: α-PSRO versus PSRO(Uniform, BR) in the MuJoCo Soccer domain. Left is the matrix
representing the probability of winning for α-PSRO and PSRO(Uniform, BR)’s best 8 agents. Right
is the α-Rank distribution over the meta-game induced by these agents. Yellow are high probabilities,
dark-blue are low probabilities.The diagonal is taken to be 0.
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